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^f	 DISCLAIMER
Y
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the
United States Government, Neither the United States nur the United
States Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, nor any of
their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees make any warranty,
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibili ty
`
	
	
for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information,
apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use
would not infringe privately owned rights.
zINTRODUCTION
The concept of product liability implies that a manufacturer is
responsible to the consumer for products that are not reasonably safe`.
Recently, consumers have become more and more aware that manufacturers
could be liable for harm incurred, by a consumer while using their
products. l Evidence of this awareness can be seen by the increase in
product liability suits and sizes of awards in recent years. Clearly
this presents a roblem for the manufacturer. Not only must the
product be reliable and safe for its intended purpose, but it must
also be safe for foreseeable misuse.
This preliminary report explores product safety and product
liability considerations for photovoltaic module/array devices. The
purpose of this study is twofold--first to aive an overview of legal
issues as they apply to design, manufacture and use; second, to
suggest a methodology to be used during design of a photovoltaic
module/array to minimize or eliminate perceived hazards. This study
does not attempt to answer any of these questions in detail, but only
to pose them sous to stimulate consideration of this area.' The
questions raised in this study can only be answered through future
efforts in concert with the manufacturers.
1 1916 Macpherson vs. Buick Motor, Inc. The courts rules that there no
longer had to be a direct contractual relationship between buyer
and manufacturer in order for the buyer to recover from harm
incurred using a defective product.
1945 Escola vs. Coca Cola. This decision extended the legal basis of
recovery to include strict liability in cases involving con-
struction defects.
1963 Greenman vs. Yuba Power Products, Inc. The court extended strict
liability to in+lude design defect cases
r„
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APPROACH`
In order to supplement the basic study, certain additional
activities were pursued.	 First, a general review of photovoltaic
literature was made using computerized literature searches. 	 Data
bases	 enorgy file,	 S file,	 endex file,
PapeInd ex an
	
A literature 
s
earch
^n , 'Conferenc
e
	 d others	 s	 'was also
made of relevant legal material as it applies'to design.
Examination was made of fyur'block III photovoltaic panels. 	 The
panels included the shingle type as wo l as panel type collector.
I
Plant trips were made to a number of photovoltaic manufacturers.
1
These trips not only inclined plant tours of manufacturing, testing
and shipping facilities but also included discussion on design and
safety aspects of photovoltaic modules.	 :Manufacturers visited included
Solar Power Corporation, Solarex Corporation, and General Electric
Company.
U
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4ELEMENTS OF SAFETY DESIGN REVIEW PROCEDURE
Fundamental to the concept of weaving safety considerations into
the design of a product is to recognize that there are three elements
which interact to create hazards with a consequent risk of injury:
the product, the person and the environment within which they function.
It is thus essential to outline a structured method which permits the
designer to address these elements in a rational way.
i
The steps listed below are an outline of a safety design review
procedure.*
1. Delineate the scope of product uses.
2. Identify the environments within which the product will be
used.	 ..
3. Describe the user population.
t P p
4. Postulate all possible hazards including estimates of
probability of occurrence and seriousness of resulting harm.
5. Delineate alternative design features or production techniques
including warnings and instructions, that can be expected to
effectively mitigate or eliminate the hazards-.
5. Evaluate such alternatives relative to the expected per-
formance standards of the product, including the following:
a) other hazards that may be introduced by the
alternatives
b) their effect on the subsequent usefulness of the
product
c) their effect on the ultimate cost of the product
d) a comparison to similar products
7. Decide which features to include in the final design.
The safety design procedure listed above should begin after the i
ginitial design has been formulated. The process begins by identifying
the actual scope of the product uses, where the product can be expected
to be used, and who will be using it. It is critical at this stage
_	 that foreseeable misuses be thoroughly explored together with the
*See, Products ''ia i ity and the Reasonably Safe Product, A. S.
Weinstein, et al_., ^'nhn Wil ey & Sons, New York.
5actual limitations and responses of the users. Taken together, they
set the boundaries of foreseeable use and misuse and foreseeable users.
Users will inevitably have a broad range of manual dexterity, strength,
and levels of understanding and awareness. Once the product use and
user situations are postulated, the next task is to identify the
hazards that are likely to arise from the interaction of the product
use, environment, and user. This is done, principally, by postulating
scenarios of occurrences which can lead to hazards.
-The hazards having been identified and the probability and
gravity of the harm that Right result having been estimated, the
question becomes, what changes, in design, can minimize or eliminate
the risk of injury? It is at this point that the problem of design
changes versus warnings to minimize a given risk must be carefully
assessed. For each warning or design change some estimate should be
made of the reduction in both probability and gravity of harm, since
such reduction can have a significant impact on the ultimate pro-
duction cost. Caution must be exercised when suggesting design changes
because the new design may substitute a new hazard for the one(s)
being eliminated.
It is also possible to take a safe product and make it unsafe by
creating unrealistic expectations in the mind of the user through,,
expressed or implied warranties. Recent court interpretations hale
included advertisements and sales literature in decisions about
warranties and have concluded that where advertising leads a user to
false expectations of the product, the manufacturer is liable for
damages, despite disclaimers in other literature.
As each consideration is addressed, the effects on product use-
fulness and cost must obviously be introduced. But product cost is
not based solely on materials, labor, marketing, overhead, and profit.
Part of the product cost is that arising from possible injuries, either
from the expected fraction of products marketed with production flaws
or from hazards that the design did not minimize. Whether these
costs are, in part, insurance premiums, settlements, judgments, or
legal fees is not important. They are part of the real``cost of the
product and can significantly affect decisions about which safety
features to incorporate in the final design. Certainly, some of these
costs (e.g., settlement, judgments) are not factors for a court in
deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. -A court per-
forming a risk-utility analysis could not account for a manufacturer's
settlement practice. Nonetheless, these considerations may weigh
heavily on the manufacturer when it decides on its design or quality
control standards
r
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DOCUMENTATION
The methodology described in the preceding section is critical
for establishing how and why the complex trade-offs were made in order
to reach the final design, including all of the literature that communi-
cates to shippers, installers, users as well as to repair and maintenance
personnel'. If all of this effort is not clearly and comprehensively
documented an important dimension of the process will be lost. The
manufacturer must be able to assess the efficacy of his decision
making process, once field data becomes available. In addition, if
the manufacturer is alleged to have produced a defective product and
is sued, it is crucial that he be able to rebut such arguments by
demonstrating the care used in designing, manufacturing and marketing
the product, For these reasons it is essential that the manufacturer
keep a comprehensive record of the process that elucidates all of the
considerations upon which the design is based.
Such documentation can be categorized ass
1. Hazard and risk data--historical, field, and/or laboratory
testing, causation analyses.* 	
=I
?. Design safety formulation--fault tree, failure mndes, hazard
analyses.
3. Warnings and instruction formulation--methodology for develop-
ment and selection. **
4. Standards--the use of in-house, voluntary, and mandat5d design
or performance requirements.
5. Quality assurance program methodology for procedure selection
and production records.
1
6. Product performance--reporting procedures, complaint file,
follow -1;p data acquisition and analysis, recall, retrofit,
instruction and warning modification.
r
7. Decision making--the "how, ' I "who," and "why" of the process.
These are the necessary elements for the data base supporting the
product safety design review. A comprehensive exposition of the basic
data, coupled with the sensitivity of the decision-making process as
i'
1.
s
i
*Appendix B contains sample of field data,
**Appendix A contains guidelines for warning development.
illustrated through significant docLimentation can provide the courts,
as well as the manufacturer, with the benchmarks needed for judging a.
product's societal acceptability,
The hazard and risk data not only should be acquired from well-
designed laboratory and field tests but also should include analyses
of any litigation, user complaints, and field Failures. Finally,
careful scrutiny of both a given manufacturer's liability claims and
reported appellate decisions for all products of the same type
throughout , the country can uncover problems or use patterns that are
important t.r`r
, 
retrofit considerations as well as for design review..
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A DESIGN REVIEW BOARD
The implementaion of a product safety design review requires
contributions from a variety of disciplines, as well as differing
viewpoints within a given discipline. Judging the boundaries of human
behavior and product behavior is too complex to be left in the hands
of one person or discipline.
The tasks of a design review board are to elicit and evaluate
data and to articulate the competing elements for the decision-making
process, not to redesign the product. Included in the responsibilities
of the group should be a review of all packaging, labeling, instructions,
and advertising material, since- the explicit representations are an
essential dimension of the expected performance of a product.
The group performing the product design review should be composed
of members from the manufacturer's organization as well as ancillary
skills from the outside;
Engineering or design
Production
Quality assurance
Testing
Service
Marketing
Psychology and human factors
Legal
Corporate management should designate a person whose sole
r
	
	 responsibility is product safety assurance to chair the design review
board. There must be established a decision-making p;Y ocess and a
review mechanism for critical decisions which include participation by
senior corporate members.
Perhaps the most important tasks to be undertaken by this board,
collectively, are the identification of the product uses and misuses,
the nature of the users and the actual product environment. Based upon
these elements, the board must then construct the hazard scenarios and
postulate the relative degree of seriousness posed by them. Once
design modifications, including warnings and instructions, have been
postulated, perhaps by the engineering department, the board must then
assess the proposed changes and make recommendations concerning the
M"	 design formulation that is to be adopted.
1.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
ILLUSTRATIVE HAZARD ASSESSMENT FAR PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULE/ARChff
The preceding sections described, in general terms, the nature of
the design safety review process In this section, an Illustrative
analysis is presented to demonstrate how this process is to be applied
to photovoltaic module/arrays. The analysis is not complete, nor is -;t
intended to offer solutions to the myriad of problems faced in the
design process. Its'-principal goal is to stimulate an awareness of
the nature of the problems as well as suggested methods for seeking
solutions. Ultimately, it is only through group effort, rational
approach and honest assessment that what is initiated here can be
completed.
There are six areas to be considered ;ndividually for which a
hazard assessment should be undertakent
1. manufacturing and assembly
2. shipping and handling
3. installation
4. c=aeration and maintenance
5. natural events
6. other events
r,
	
	 In each of the above areas a scenario of an accident will be
developed as an example of the type of thought process involved. This
will be followed by a table suggesting other scenarios and a ranking
of probability of harm P and the seriousness of the resulting harm S.
The probability of harm multiplied by the seriousness of harm
(P x S) permits a relative ranking of the listed hazards. A numerical
scale of values from one to ten will be used for both the probability
and seriousness scales. A seriousness of ten represents critical
injury or death, while a probability of ten would indicate that the
 hazard will occur every time a person comes in contact with or uses
the product.
Following this ranking, suggested recommendations are listed
which are intended to eliminate or reduce the probability of harm and
the resulting injury.
It should be noted that the numerical values listed for the
probability of harm (P) and the seriousness (S) are, for the most part,
subjective assessments since little, if any, data are available. The
numbers are not to be viewed as absolute in any sense, but are used to
assess the relative rankings of hazard as a guide to the design formu-
lation. It is one of the functions of the design review board to
develop these rankings, collectively, based upon whatever data and
perceptions that can be brought to bear on the problem. Much of the
time, however, the hazard index will be bas pw upon subjective analysis,
rather than objective data. The integrity of the process thus rests on
a thoughtful, careful and complete analysis_.
g
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MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY
As the terrestrial photovoltaics market begins to grow, production
techniques for automated cell fabrication and assembly will begin to
appear.	 Until the large volume terrestrial photovoltaics module market
develops, many companies will be using hand assembly lines.	 Evaluation
of workei safety in t manufacturing environment is a well known and
documented subject.	 Many insurance companies have a review program
for their clients.	 The Occupational Health and Safety Administration
'	 has regulations and guidelines on worker safety. 	 One area that needs
further investigation is the effects of exposure to silicon either
directly or indirectly.
	 The major source of silicon exposure is in
the cutting of silicon to make cells which is currently controlled by
exhaust loads.	 Exposure to solvents from encapsulant materials may
I' also be a problem.
	
Although not a hazard in the area of manufactureiF
and assembly, problems arising from quality assurance can emerge later
in the operation of array system.
	
For example, poorly solderer'
connections can lead to hot spots which could lead to system degredation
and/or a possible fire.
Probability	 Seriousness
i Endemic Hazard	 P	 S	 P x S
1) Exposure to Toxic
i Materials	 8	 3	 24	 i
i.
Recommendations
1.	 The general hazards associated with the workplace are to bert
addressed using OSHA regulations.
2.	 Obtain data on toxicity problems associated with silicon and
.' solvents and utilize whatever assistance the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and Occup a tional
Safety and Health Administration ( OSHA) can give in instituting
procedures to minimize or eliminatepotential hazards in theser
j
areas.
1
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SHIPPING AND HANDLING
'	 1 shipping and handling represent an area in which the manu-
facturer must take precaution to decrease hazards related to his
product,	 Modules can range in size from 48" x 481 1 to 32" x 96 11 and
can weigh anywhere from 70 to 240 pounds, depending on the material
t	 „	 ' and size,	 It is obvious tht panels will often travel great
distances by several means of transportation and be handled several
times in their transit. 	 Thus a possible accident is the dropping of
the photovoltaic panel container, 	 This dropping could result in a
minor injury to the person carrying the container. 	 If the container
is then opened and if the glass cover plate is broken or shattered,
inJury could result from the broken glass,	 If the container is
opened and exposed to light, when examining the module for damage, a
person could be startled and suffer injury by falling or in other
foreseeable ways, if the terminals are shorted and a minor, non-lethal
shock occurs.
Since panels can be and are sold individually, off-the-shelf,
an unskilled user would not necessarily be aware of the electrical
hazard which would result from daisy-chaining.	 Alternatively, series,^.-
wired panels capable of producing up to 600 volts each, could pose a .
serious hazard individually or inadvertently miswired in an array.
The high probability of such events skiggests that each and every panel
should contain an appropriate, permanent warn?ng,
Probability*	 Probability of
t
Scenario	 of Harm	 Seriousness	 P x S
1) electrical shock
from !nodule
^. (series wired)	 7	 6	 42
2) electrical shock
from sub-array
^i (pre-wired)	 6	 8	 48
3) inJury due to
broken glass
	
"	 6	 25
4) localized  burns from
electrical shock
	 7	 7	 49
6) reverse bias leading
to fire
	
1	 2	 2
6) injuries resulting
from dropping of
r containers	 3	 5	 is
A	 ^y
7) other inj uri es from
minor shock
	
2
12
5 10
*These are the estimated probabilities of injury occurring once
an event, such as dropping a container, has occurred. No estimate
is given here as to the probability of the event occurring in the
first place. The event probability must be estimated in order to
rank all hazards from all sources,
^_	
z
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From these hypotheses and their relative ranking, a sense of the
magnitude of the problems is generated. If it is concluded that these
problems warrant attention, then consideration as to possible solutions
is to be developed. For example, glass breakage could be reduced by
using thicker glass. But this change will increase panel weight, lower
efficiency, increase cost and can increase the.-everity of the injuries
resulting from the dropping of a panel or container.
Alternatively, eachpanel could be covered with opaque, adhesive
paper. This would minimize injuries from glass breakage and keep the
panel electrically inactive: under most foreseeable circumstances until
it is deliberately removed. If the glass breakage problem is not con-
sidered serious, but the electrical hazards --are deemed important, then
a shunt resistor could be installed on eacil panel and/or plastic
guards placed over the output terminals that are difficult to remove
or require a special tool for removal could be considered. Finally, it
may be decided that only a warming be applied to each panel and no
design change is necessary at all.
If modules are shipped in containers, their design should not be
overlooked. In establishing a basis for the integrity of such a con-
tainer, an appropriate drop height and surface should be decided. For
example, i s a design drop height of eight feet more appropriate than
four feet, if shipping i ► likely  to be by railroad?
Such decisions and the trade-offs involved must be made consciously
and documented together with the reasoning supporting the final decisions,
To summarize, the alternatives described above, arising from the
scenarios, are;
1. Install a shunt resistor in each panel.
2. Install plastic guards over the module's electrical output
terminals.
3. Use thicker glass ,panel,
4, Cover the panel front with non-transparent paper.
5, Place warnings and/or instructions on each panel.
u
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After alternatives have been described, some estimate as to their
effectiveness should bet_postulated. 	 Again, it is a subjective deter-
mination,
	 However, this will permit assessin g whether or not any
reasonable reduction in hazard levee could be achieved. 	 Listed below
is the estimated change in each risk or'njury, if, for example, all
of the alternatives in the list were incorporated.
Probabil • 'j,
	Probability of
Scenario of Harm
	 Seriousness P x S
1) electrical shock
from module" 1	 6 b
2) electrical shock
from sub-array 1	 8 8
3) injury due to
broken glass 1	 5 5
4) localized burns
from electrical shock 1	 7 „7
5) reverse bias leading
to fire 1	 2 2
_ s) injuries resulting from
dropping of container 3	 2 15
7) other injuries from
minor shock 1	 2 2
R Tables such as the preceding ones would then permit the formu-
lation of benefit/cost analyses of the suggested alternatives, based in
part upon the projected reduction in both probability and seriousness
of harm. The design review group would then be in a position to make
recommendat ,^ons as to which, if any, design changes will meet all of
the manufacturer's constraints as a reasonable balance of all
considerations.
These analyses, coupled with all of the rationale supporting the
decisions, become both the focus and the source of the product safety
review as anintegral part of the design, manufacture and marketing
functions.
t
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INSTALLATION
The risks of injury in the installation of arrays are somewhat
dependent on which type of panel is used--either the shingle type
(Figure la and b) or the module type. For the module type there are
four different mounting systems; rack mount, standoff mount, direct
foct:nt, and integral mount (Figure 2), because the rack mount system
,/,is at ground lev%fl it is easier to install and maintain but at the
`'same time has a M gher hazard level because of its general accessibility
in contrast to arrays mounted on the roof of a dwelling.
Probability Probability of
Scenario	 of Harm Seriousness P x S
1) injury during
unpacking	 3 5 15
2) electrical shock
from array during
installation	 7 6 42
3) electrical shock_
from cabling	 7 8 56
4) localized burns
from electrical
shock
	
7 7 49
5) injury to others,
when job site is
unattended	 8 8 64
Some of the possible considerations which could eliminate or minimize
the risks of injury.
1.	 Every installation to have documentation to cover
a) unpacking of modules
b) site preparation and module storage
c) safe installation practices
d) procedures when job site is left unattended
e) start up, check out, shut down procedures*
*A sample of this type of documentation is given in Appendix G.
s..
l2. Cabling and connectors be protected against shock by guarded
plugs, requiring special tools for removal.
This listing is not intended to be complete, but serves to point
out that 'installation can create risks of inJury to two distinct
classes of persons: the installer and the curious bystander, adults
as well as children, attracted by the novelty of the installation. , The
installer must be given adequate and easily u0erstood instructions for
the problems of installation. But the risks that can arise when the
Job site is left unattended each day and over weekends especially when
the system is only partially completed presents hazards that may equal
or exceed thos^;to which the installer is exposed. In the current
legal climate, the manufacturer is expected to and is held to foreseeing
such highly likely events as well as anticipating inadequate job-site
practices by installers.
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OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
It is in the area of residential operation and maintenance that
many accidents will arise from unskilled persons Interacting with the
photovoltaic system. The number of times that the following events
will occur will largely depend on the type of installation and its
geographical location. The activities that will precipitate the
events are general maintenance, panel cleaning, panel replacement,
wiring repair, and gasket repair.
Probability	 Probability of
Scenario	 of Harm	 Seriousness	 P x S
1) walks on array
breaks_' glass	 3	 5	 is
2) slides off array
and falls	 6	 7	 42
3) electrically shocked
from array	 .4	 8	 32
Some of the possible considerations that could eliminate or minimize
the risks of injury:
1. Documentation in the form of a detailed step-by -step outline
procedure be supplied on all aspects of the photovoltaic
array system.
2. An access system such as the one depicted in Figure 3.
3. A control panel to read I-V curves for each string.
4. Need for special tools, that are unavailable to a user,, in
order to undertake electrical repairs.
Apart from the considerations listed above
,
_ ' ^ broader view of the
problem could consider ( a) includ ing a service contract in the price
of an installation, with repairs and maintenance to be performed only
by authorized persons; (b) limiting or controlling sales of panels only
to such authorized maintenance and repair groups, making them inaccessible
to unskilled persons.
It is evident that the problems envisioned here begin with the
unskilled home -owner using an aluminum 1, ,Pdder to clim& , to the roof in
order to discover the source of a probleih. It is this foreseeable
eventuality, with a high probability of risk, that  ma6gfacturer
I
;I--
ar
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should consider in the entire spectrum of uses of his product. It is
clear, today, that a manufacturer of panels will'hot be able to defend
liability simply by stating that he was not responsible for the entire
system, if in fact, he holds himself knowledgeable for any system
design.
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NATURAL EVENTS
There are many scenarios that can be proscribed around what are
termed "natural" events. Only a few are postulated here in order to
illustrate the nature of the concerns that should tae addressed.
Fire
An array in a residential or commercial setting could be exposed
to fire caused by conditions unrelated to the panels. Are there any
special problems that can arise when an array is exposed either to
direct fire or to intense heat and then sprayed with water? Have
any tests been conducted to discover the effect of such exposure?
When a fire occurs in daylight, what strategies are appropriate for
informing fire fighters and others of a concurrent danger of electrical
shock when in close proximity to the array?
Snow
When snow -accumulates_ on a roof array and sufficient sunlight
penetrates to warm up the panel by its operation, a condition exists
for the entire snow load to slide off. If the probability of this
event is significantly greater than that for existing roofing materials,
should some provision be incorporated in the system design to minimize
the potential hazards to passersby or property -in the vicinity?
Lightning, Hail, Sandstorms, Corrosive Atmosphere
Each of these events and others could present concerns in the
areas of use, performance and/or risk of injury. To what extent have
these areas been addressed, tested for and des4r^,n decisions articulated?
The  panels, the array, the structure and the wiring, viewed as a system,
should be examined in the light of the effects of such natural events
on each of the elements and then on the entire system.
It is clear that before any performance or design standards can
be formulated, all likely events should be addressed, whatever data is
available should be collected and analyzed and tests should be devised
r. and conducted. Following this, reasonable standards can be postulated
and developed to achieve a reasonable balance among safety, performance,
useful life, repair and cost.
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`'	 OTHER EVENTS
Attractive Nuisance
Apart from, and in addition to, the hazards described earlier for
each of the principal areas from manufacturing to operation and main-
tenance, there exists the potential problems that could arise from the
unfamiliarity and hence attractiveness of an installation. The
youngsters who view the array as a target for B guns or other weapons
and who may be injured as a result are a potential for liability, In
order to discover just what this array does, the curious will climb
fences and roofs to satisfy that desire. Can additional precautions
be taken in design to account for the inevitability of such evez,,Zs,
recognizing that warnings alone are unlikely to suffice? Whether or
not any design alterations can be or are formulated to account for
such events, the decisions must ultimately be based upon careful,
documented assessment.
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
A. Sto_ race Devices
In all probability, a large number of residential photovoltaic
systems will utilize batteries for storing energy. While the main-
tenance and safety of DC battery storage systems is well known and
documented, such information and appropriate precautions must be part
of the concern of the module manufacturer who prescribes, gives con-
sultation on or designs complete systems. The following areas should
be addressed for a battery storage system: Electrical protection,
chemical hazards, fire hazards and concerns for control, monitoring
and ventilation.
B. Utility Backup
Another proposed auxiliarysystem s that of interconnection with
a, public utility. The obvious concerns arise from
(a) the need for an automatic disconnect between the photovoltaic
system and the utility's lines, if the utility suffers a
complete. loss of power.
(b) The problem faced by a utility if a significant feed by a
large number of photovoltaic arrays is suddenly lost because
of a natural event or other cause.
24
In the former event, if-'there is not an automatic disconnect, a
lineman may suffer; , injury if the array is feeding into what is believed
to be a dead line.
	
In the second event, the utility may not be able
to pick up the load caused by a loss of the photovoltaic source rapidly
enough to avoid either a blackout or a rapid drop in voltage. 	 If
significant damage occurs, there will inevitably arise the question of
responsibility and hence liability,
These ,;.Peas, too, should be given consideration, not only by
module manufacturers who may have to share at least some of the
responsibility, but the other viable ehzitities including battery
manufacturers and the public utilities.
`	
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The FMEA is a technique for systematically id itifying, dnalyzing
and documenting the possible failure modes within 'a design and the
effects of such failures on system performance and personnel safety.
The FMEA is a bottom-to-top analysis which begins at the bottom, the
component level, and works upward to the end product or system level
where the effect (if the failure on system performance or personnel
safety is determined.
The FTA is similar to the FMEA in that it too is a technique foil
systematically identifying, analyzing and documenting potential safety
and reliability problems, The FTA differs from the FMEA in its method
of documentation and in the fact that it is a top-to-bottom anailysis.
It begins with an assumed undesirable event at the top or system level
and identifies the events at subsequent lower levels in the system
that can cause the undesirable top event.
The purpose of both the FMEA and"FTA is to identify areas in the
design or hardware where improvements are required to ensure the system
will be reliable and safe for its intended use and reasonably fore-
seeable misuse. The FMEA/FTA can serve to increase the efficiency and
productivity of design reviews by focusing design review emphasis on
weak areas in the design, it can also serve,! as a source of material
for use in preparing reliability and quality.= assurance test programs,
and yin preparing care and use books or repair and maintenance manuals.
Who Conducts the FMEA/FTA?
Generally, the FMEA or FTA can be performed more quickly by the
responsible design engineer because he is most familiar with his design.
Hav°llng a reliability engineer pevform the analysis allows a fresh
objective analysis of the design. If the analysis is conducted by the
design engineer, it should be checked by the reliability engineer, and
vice versa. Together they go over the possible failure modes, possible
causes, how failures would be evidenced or detected, the consequences
of failures both on the performance and safety of the product.
When to Use FMEA/FTA?
The FMEA/FTA should become an integral part of the normal product.
design process.
The primary purpose of the FMEA/FTA is, as stated earlier ) to
identify areas in the design or hardware where improvements should be
tuck of this information was extracted from the Westinghouse Electric
Corporation booklet entitled: A Guideline for the FMEA/FTA._ FMEA: Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis; FTA. _Ta_41t Tree Analysis,
3
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made to ensure the system will be reliable and sdife for its intended
use-and reasonably foreseeable misuse. Positive action must be taken
to correct the deficiencies highlighted by the FMEA or FTA before the
job can be considered completed. Design changes can be made most
effectively during the design stage. Making the necessary changes
after the product is in production is more costly. No new product
design or major redesign should be released for production without an
FMEA or FTA having been conducted and the follow up actions accomplished.
I,
	
	 Use the FMEA when primary emphasis is to be placed on assuring
that each component in the design will be examined for possible failure
R	 modes and the effect on the overall design.
Use the FTA when primary emphasis is to be placed on ana lyzi ng
specific undesirable top events for identifying causes and t^ei.r
probabilities of occurrence.
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FMEA
FMEA Procedure
The FMEA procedure described in this guideline is a basic
procedure. There is no one right way to perform an FMEA or one right
format to use. The importart thing is that a form such as the one
shown in Figure 4 be used to guide thu analysis through a systematic
process and document the results.
The,FMEA, as described herein, is sometimes called a failure
mode effects and criticality analysis (FME b CA) because the criti-
cality of each failure mode is analyzed in this procedure.ii
STEP 1--Cottect the Vata to b^ Uzed.tn the Akw2y,6i6
First, collect the information for conducting the FMEA including
drawings, schematics, layouts, parts lists, bill of materials, infor-
mation on the operating environment,, and any other descriptive infor-
mation on system operation which may be available. Other useful
documents might be the product design specification and other
specifications, industry or association standards, and perhaps
particulars from the contractual requirements. If the system is in
the early stages of its design and development, the information avail-
able for FMEA may be limited, and the depth of analysis will be limited.
However, if the desj'gn is completed or a prototype hardware model
exists, the analysis will result in a thorough examination of the
system.
STEP 2--Prc paxe a Form Ooh the Ana.CyA.1,A
Figure 4 describes a sample form which can be Used for the FMEA.
There is no one correct form to use, Prepare a form which best suits
the person conducting the analysis and the design or hardware being
analyzed.
r.
`	 STEP 3--SequentiaVy .fiat each loan,: to ire analyzed by pat nwnba and
by name
STEP 4--8A.ie6ty deacn<i.be the wtcrtion(a) of each p"t in the zydtem
STEP 5--Wt the po4zibte daUxAe modes Q'I which each part,: can j'ait
Frequently there are two or more failure modes for a part, each
of which could cause different effects on the system performance or
personnel safety,
r-
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STEP 6--t.Let the e66ect each 6aUvAe mode woutd have on 4y4tem
pen6 oAman ee
For each failure mode identified for a particular part, list the
effect which that failure could have on the system performance. It
is quite useful to describe the effect on system performance as it
would be seen through the eyes of the user. For example, it would be
better to explain "Dirt on panel surface" rather than "reduction of
system output."
STEP 7- L%at the W.Uca,Uty o^ each 4a42u&e mode void the entuing
nesutt on system pen&oimanee on peneonnet 4a6et
The criticality analysis is done by.establishing a ranking of
the seriousness and implications of the failure. For example, a
failure might be Critical, Major, Minor or Insignificant., The
Critical failure is one which causes or can cause harm to personnel.
It is a safety hazard. The Major fault is one which causes serious
effect on operation and requires immediate attention. A Minor fault
is one which,:does not cause immediate concern but will require
attention in the near future. A failure which is Insignificant is
one which can be tolerated because it has little or no effect on
operation. One popular method of using this measure is as follows:
C - Critical: There is a safety hazard.
MA - Major: System performance is out of control; system is in
need of immediate repair, service is required immediately.
MN Minor: System performance is degraded but operation can
	
r	 continue; repair or correction is needed at earliest
opportunity.
I	 Insignificant: Failure has no immediate effect on system
performance.
STEP 8--Wt the mea6uhe o6 r.obabi.i,cty o6 the daittae movie occulvting
EO ter the measure of probability of the failure mode occurring.
This eeitry may be very subjective and relate closely to the experience
of the,"analyst, or it may be quantatively calculated from actual test
data br field use or from reference to an established part failure
rate handbook. Another useful technique is to rank the relative
probability of a part failure to the other possible failure modes in
	
!	 that system. For example, one method of establishing relative
probability of failure is:
H - High
Relative degrees of probability	 M - Moderate'`
of failure occurring.	 L - Low
U	 Unlikely
i
.*.^.rwk ,..FS•s-firN•. snr.r-._,,....:.,.,. „_--.:,..,.rte..	 ....	 v.c
	 _i, ti,1rtjk (g,}; f. t{r^l
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F	 STEP	 i9-r Revew the anatyA" detenm ne coheke cowt"ve action
d e ed and 6o.P m up to bee that appnopot ate ae#,c'.on .iA
.taken
This is the most important step in the NMEA. The FMEA points the
way to product improvement. The coppleted FMEA should be reviewed by
the design review board to determini what follow up actions are required.
, f	 Unless positive actions are taken to correct the deficiencies identi-
fied by the analysis, the task is^only partially completed. The action
items which are generated by the FMEA should by documented as shown by
the Action /Responsibility column in figure 4. Another very effective
way to implement the follow up action is to use a separate "Action
Items" sheet. The "Action Items" sheet should list each required
action item as identified by the FMEA, the person responsiblefor the
action, and a date for completing the action item. The design review
board should review the findings and recommendations of the FMEA and
the Action Items list with the design engineer or reliability engineer
z	 making the analysis and ensure that corrective action i s taken.r
s
L
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To illustrate the procedure, first, an example of the FMEA is
presented using a common appliance, the steam iron.	 Following the
' next section on the fault tree analysis, both of these methods are
illustrated for,	 photovoltaic panel.
' An , Example of FMEA
In Figures 5 and 6, the steam iron example is shown. 	 In the
case of much larger systems or equipment, the larger system or equip-
ment can, and often times, must be divided into smaller sub-systems
+ for the purposes of analysis.^,^
The first requirement is the descript 	 e information.	 Shown in
Figure 5 is the Parts List. 	 Additional information for an FMEA would
be an electrical schematic and assembly drawings.
A portion of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for the steam
iron is shown in Figure 6.
S
s
i
+S
a
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P
F
PARTS LIST
ITEM: Steam Iron Date:
MODEL: HSSF44-A	 Prepared:+_
P_ Part Quantity
1 8030 Plug	 ............ • .... 1
2 210031 Cored	 ................. 8 h.
3 4042 Handle	 .............. 1
4 12877 Upper Cover.. ,	 ........ 1
18 25303 Bimetal Strip ........... 1
14 74503 Rlvat ................. 1
20 6087
7
2 Sao Plata	 ............. 1
21 63423 P,	 re Plug	 ........... 2
Figure 5
.MLUA. MDO......lT..M.Lra.
i^
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There are two significant d0ferences between FTA and the FMEA.
The first is the method of documentation. The FTA uses a set of
standard 'logic symbol s
 to represent events and relationships in the
hardware. The FMEA, as-shown, uses a part-by-part tabular form
to identify failure modes. The second difference is the starting
point or the analysis. The FTA begins at the top of the system with
a statement of an undesired event in the system, The FMEA begins at
the bottom, the component level, and works upward to the system level
where the effect on the system performance is described.
The FTA begins with a statement of an undesired event.
	 This
establishes the top of the tree.
	 Next, the events which can lead to
the top event are identified.
	 The events which can cause the next
level are identified.	 A tree of events is thus established until the
undesired events and failures are traced to the lowest identifiable
level which most often leads to the component level.
A set of logic systems, Figure 7, is used to develop the fault
tree.	 They are standard symbols which should be used when performing
• fault tree analysis.
STEP 1--Cottect the data to be m6ed in the anaty Z6
Same as in Step 1 in FMEA procedure.
STEP 2--1denUjy the Top Event (A FcuLtt, Faietuce on Pefwonrtee
Hazand
The top event is the starting point for the analysis and should
therefore be well defined.	 It is an event, a malfunction, or failure
which affects system performance or personnel safety.
	 The top event
' should be definable and,­-,measurable.
In some cases there may be more than one top event in which case
each fault tree can be developed individually. For example consider
the steam iron again. The functions of a steam iron are;
k
(1) to provide heat for ironing.
(2) to provide steam when required.
(3) and a necessary
 and inherent requirement to he reasonably
safe for use.
Of course the "system" is going to be hot beyond human tolerance when
it is being used and that is an acceptable feature but the possibility
of electrical shock hazard most be considered. 5o, in defining the
is	 _..	 ,........,..... ..._	 -__ .L_	 _^.:..,.._^n.......:..m^......-s...^_^. .sa .>.... w ..a...._.- ........: 	 a 6A..._^-.	 .a..u.....^,..`.	 .^_
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top events there are three possible events which could be defined as
top events:
(1) temperatures absence:of or too high
(2) steam, none or present when not required
I (3) inJury hazard, electrical shock;!
Note that these three top events can be readily defined and measured.
STEP 3--Vevetop the Fautt Tnee
The development of a fault tree begins by stating the top
undesired event such as a safety hazard, a system failure or some
definable fault. (Use an event rectangle as indicated in Figure 7j
The starting point for the FTA <''is thereby established. The analysis
continues by identifying the events on the next level down which
could cause the top event. The analyst must study the events to
determine if they will occur as an AND function or an OR function to
cause the top event. (See Figure 8 examples.) The fault tree
development continues in this manner downward from the top event and
accounts for all of the contributing events which can lead to the top
event. The development of the tree is concluded when the lowest
possible level is reached to which a basic failure event can be
assigned. The basic failure events are represented by a circle on the
fault tree. The basic events are
 generally hardware failures, errors
of commission, or errors of omission.
STEP 4--Mz i,gn Qna».tcjied Venues o6 Pt babZ ty to Each Event on .the,
Fau.?t Ttee
The quantification of the basic fault events can come from several
sources among which are: established source of component failure rates;
failure rates from actual field use estimates of rates of occurrences.
For example, consider a gasoline driven motor-generator set. There are
established failure rates for the electrical components which make up
the voltage regulator "subsystem." These failure rates come from
established sources of component failure rates. As for the motor,
years of experience in using that type of motor may provide reliable
failure rates. These failure rates come from actual field use. And
an estimate may have to be made that one time in every x uses the
operator will forget to check the gasoline tank and it will be empty.
This is an estimated rate of occurrence based on the best information
available. These are the kind's of data which are used to determine the
probability of the top undesired event occurring.
STEP 5--R'evieio the anaty6i.6, deWtm.i.ne where comeWve action i.6
dietated and Sotlow-up to .bee that appnopt4ate action a taken
As in the FMEA, this is the most important step in the FTA. The
completed FTA should be reviewed by the design review board to determine
1
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what follow-upactions are required. Unless positive actions are taken
to correct the deficiencies identified by the analysis, the task is
only partially completed. The action items which aregenorated by the
FTA should be documented on an "Action Items" sheet. The "Action Items"
sheet is a very effective way to implement the follow-up action,, It
should list each required action as identified by the FTA, the- , person
responsible for the action, and a date for completing the act^,'on. T
design review board should review the findings and recommendations of
the FTA and the Action Items list with the design engineer or reliability
engineer making the analysis and ensure that corrective action is taken.
Revisions
As design changes occur during the production life of the product,
the FMEA and/or FTA should be revised to be kept current with the latest
configuration. This becomes an important element in the entire docu-
mentation package.
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Figure 8
Fi gure 7
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M 6„ xanpl e of FTA
The steam iron example used to illustrate the FMEA is used
again here, this time applying the techniques of the FTA.
The steam iron performs two major functions: ( 1) provides heat,
(2) provides steam. Suppose the undesired event was stated as "No
Steam from Iron." This undesired event implies that there is no heat
to make steam or no water to make steam.
The Fault Tree for "No Steam from Iron" would look like the tree
shown in Figure 9.
Suppose a Fault free which looked just like the "No Steam from
Iron" example was of'a system for which event probabilities were
available. The analysis could then be quantified as shown in Figure 10.
The event probabilities are:
Cl	 .005	 C5	 .001
C2	 .0005	 C6	 .001
C3	 .0005	 C7	 .80
C4	 .002	 E1	 .06
This type of analysis permits a quantification of the top event
or any of the lower contributing events. In the example of Figure ltd
it can be seen that the top undesired event, R1, has a probability of
occurrence of .058, or about 1 out of every 17 times. Further
inspection shows that event R2 will occur 1 out of every 125 times and
R3 will occur 1 out of every 20 times (occurrence probabilities of .008
vs. .050). It can be seen that events comprising R3 influence the
undesired top event RI more than R2 does. Further investigation shows
that event R5 influences R3 more than does R4, and so on.
An analysis of this type is of value in identifying the areas
where more effort such as design`, test, or inspection would be of
greatest value.
i.
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An ka pR q of FM1EAJFTA &plied to A Photovoltaic Device
A. FMEA
Using the guide given in the earlier discussion an FMEA was con-
ducted for a. Block III General Electric shingle, Several changes were
made in the FMEA Analysis Form to conform to the special requirements
of the device:
1) A column labeled Failure Cause(s) was added to make the
document more useful by providing additional information,
2) Under Step 7- -The "C" denoting Critical is replaced by
one of the following:
CA * death
CB - serious injury
CC - minor, injury
Data for Steps 1-4 were obtained from the General Electric
Report, "Design, 	 Fabricati on, Test, Qualification and Price
Analysis of 'Third-Generation' Design Solar Cell Modules."
The following page is the FMEA chart. The subjective conclusaons
concerning, for example, probability and criticality are illustrative
of a best j udgment result.
B. FTA
The data used in this FTA is the same as that used in the preceding
FMEA. In this case the top event has been identified as "No Electrical
Power." This is not to say that this is the only top evenT7
	
e	 r
probabilities used in this FTA are only estimates and are included just
to show the mathematics of Fault Tree Analysis, The example illustrates
the use of the logic symbols and methodology described earlier,
i
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SUMMARY
This report is an exploratory survey of the areas of concern, the
generic types of hazards that can arise, the methodologies for analysis
and the types of alternatives that can be devised to enhance safety and
reduce liability in the use of photovoltaic energy sources. The report
is not intended to be complete, but is to serve as a catalyst for
generating the comprehensive procedures and analysis that should be
part of the design formulation and manufacture of photovoltaic modules,
arrays and systems.
It is safe to say that today's product liability climate will
persist and can expose the module manufacturer to litigation over
issues that seem remote from legitimate concerns over materials, pro-
duction, performance and cost. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
scenarios postulated in this report are foreseeable and will be thrust
upon manufacturers as responsibilities for which they will be held
accountable. It is simply insufficient for manufacturers to disclaim
knowledge of errant human behavior, of foreseeable misuse or of well-
meaning, but hazardous attempts to maintain or repair photovoltaic
systems.
Of all the elements within the distributive chain from the manu-
facturer to the youngster playing on a partially-completed installation,
it is the manufacturer who is generally held to have the knowledge of and
should have accounted for the reasonably foreseeable events.
The appropriate time to interweave concerns for safety, reliabili ty
and performance is during the development phase of anew technology.
'this is the time for the photovoltaics industry to set up the
procedures, implement the analyses and testing and generate the
documentation.
If such an activity is begun now, the result will be safer and
better understood products and a commensurate reduction in adverse
liability.
Warnings can be a means for reducing the risk of injury. However,
a warning is not a substitute for good design. A warning should only
be used if there is no other effective design alteration that could
reasonably reduce the risk of injury.
The difficulties with warnings arises first from the fact that the
language must be able to communicate with all persons who, potentially,
can come in contact with the product and thus it is inevitable that
certain classes of persons will not be benefited. Second, many if
not most injuries result from inadvertent acts and warnings can have
little effect on human behavior when attention is focused on a more
important or distracting event. It is apparent, too, that the
probability of a warning being read and remembered is generally quite
low.
When a warning is to be used, however, it must be based upon the
following considerations:
a, A statement of the hazard or danger.
b. A statement of the injury that can occur.
c. A statement of the action to be taken to reduce or eliminate
the risk.
d. The language must be clear and easily understood by the
majority of persons likely to come in contact with the
product.
e. Symbols, graphics, size and location must be such as to
reasonably draw the attention of those to whom it is
addressed.
f. It must be sufficiently permanent to last for the useful life
of the product to which it is attached.
For example, a warning that might be appropriate for each panel
or module could read:
DANGER
00 NOT TOUCH
THIS IS V =CfiRT^`AL L DEVICE
A SHOCK CAN KILL
Wires, boxes or anything else on the
bottom may cause a shock. For proper
handling, READ INSTRUCTIONS FIRST.
4C
Depending on the foreseeable uses of a particular module design,
the appropriate wording may be different and reference to instruction
may be inapplicable or unnecessary, For an array, it may be
appropriate to have the critical instructions permanently affixed to
the structure for immediate access, since it is foreseeable that
instructions are often misplaced or are inaccessible when needed.
't
	
	 Finally, specialized or technical langguage must be avoided. For
example, such words and phrases as: "Modules," "connected in series,
"terminals," "lethal" convey little meaning to the non-technical or
unsophisticated person.
"
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Appendix B
.2
The following data are extracted from the report '"Larry Dumas
_	 Module Durability Experience," dated 9/23/80.
This is an example of the type of data and collection procedures
necessary as a foundation for the safety analyses of the type
suggested in this report. Such procedures and data should be
standardized for effective use by all manufacturers.
Data is essential for FMEA/FTA studies, quality assurance
programs, standards development and for cost/benefit analysis of
proposed design modifications.
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Appendix c
Reprinted below is part of a report by S. E. Forman and E. E.
Landsman, Safety Procedures for the 25- KW Solar Photovoltaic Array at
Mead, Nebras a. t"I provides a wr^'tten out—step-by-step procedure for
working on a p otovoltaic array system. This is the type of communi-
cation that should be developed for all array systems.
II.	 Electrical Work on Back Surface of Array
A,	 Preparation
1. Place those sections of the field to be worked on in the
open-circuit mode via the field control panel in the
trailer,
CAUTION:	 A high voltage exists within module strings.
Avoid contact with modules.
2. Ground the array test box to the metal support frame
being worked on by attaching the clip lead to the frame.
3. Verify that test box is set at aped-circuit for all
strings.
4. Pull all connectors from Junction box of frame being
worked on.
NOTE;	 There should be no arcing when disconnecting
connectors.
	
If arcs occur, notify supervisor
before proceeding.
	
Cap open junction box
connectors,
5. Attach the connectors from each string on the frame to the
test box via mating connectors that are in place on test
box.	 Match string numbers when possible (i.e., unless
the	 are not noted on connectors at the frame junction
box,
6. Test all strings for leakage-current to ground.
NOTE:	 If meter d al registers more than 10 microamps,
STOP, do not proceed with inspection.
Notify supervisor.
Return all ground switches to the OPEN position.
J
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7. Measure and record in the log book the open-circuit
voltage, short-circuit current, and ground currents for
all strings bein worked on. (Log book contains range
of acceptable va ues.)
NOTE: Notify supervisor if discrepancies occur.
8. Place all strings in shorted condition in the test box.
B Connect a ground as close as electrically possible to each
wire connected to the work site, but not at the work site.
OBJECTIVE: Guarantee that all wires are grounded even if
disconnected during the work.
NOTE: A. Grounding connections may, under some conditions,
draw an arc. Thus, keep eyes and skin away from
the point of electrical contact.
B. When frame grounding, always attach lead to frame
first, then to the point being grounded.
C. Measure voltage directy from the work sites to the frame.
Proceed with planned operation unless dangerous voltages are
noted (over 50 volts)„
D. Upon completing planned operation, remove ground carefully
as an arc may be drawn.
NOTE: Remove lead from grounded point first, then remove
lead from frame ground.
E. Open-circuit a.11 strings.
F Remove string connectors from test box.
G. Reconnect string connectors to proper points on frame junction
box.
NOTE: There should be no arcing.
i
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